Very occasionally another commentator hidden among the swamps and jungle of the MSM and on-line media will put together a succinct exposition of a complex and pressing issue.
Which is great for me as I then don't have to spend any time whatsoever re-inventing the wheel.
Whilst the two major UK indigenous tribal parties continue their brutal exchanges of epithets and hyperbole which threatens to boil over into possibly something being done about it at some point in the not too distant future if at all; Syria remains the escalator of serious big power rivalry that is inexorably moving toward the end game and a resolution one way or the other.
And neither of them offers hope to a world watching helplessly on from the sidelines.
The city and province of Idlib is said to be the final redoubt of anything in the order of 10,000 head-chopping islamic terrorists ( ISIS/Daesh,Al Qaeda and all the theological factions in between .)
The governments of Russia and Turkey with Iran and last in the queue Syria attempting a grand compromise and Realpolitik interim solution from the Metternich/Talleyrand playbook on how to do grown up international diplomacy.
Herewith gleaned from IRIN -The inside story on emergencies-website this enlightening piece on just who the heck is who and why they're trying to kill everyone else in Idlib,Syria.
As the Syrian government prepares for an offensive on the rebel-held
province of Idlib, rebel factions are divided in their loyalties and
outlooks. Here’s a look at who would be fighting President Bashar
al-Assad’s forces in what could become the last major battle of Syria’s
war.
While Turkey controls the rebels in nearby Afrin and al-Bab, the
landscape in Idlib is more complex. Two major factions dominate – the
National Liberation Front and Tahrir al-Sham – and they differ on their
positioning towards Ankara.
Turkey’s favourite is the NLF, which is led by Fadlallah al-Hajji, a
Muslim Brotherhood ally. The NLF includes Turkey-friendly Islamists like
Ahrar al-Sham, the Noureddine al-Zengi Brigades, Failaq al-Sham, Jaish
al-Ahrar, and groups that fought under the Free Syrian Army banner, like
the Victory Army and the 2nd Coastal Division.
Big but brittle, the NLF is held together by Turkish sponsorship and
shared enemies: al-Assad’s government, Syrian Kurdish groups, and
hardline jihadists.
The NLF’s main rival in Idlib is
Tahrir al-Sham,
a jihadist group that controls the provincial capital, the Bab al-Hawa
border crossing with Turkey, and other key areas in Idlib.
Led by Abu Mohammed al-Golani, Tahrir al-Sham grew out of what used
to be the Nusra Front, Syria’s official al-Qaeda franchise. It is
classified as a terrorist group by the
UN as well as by the
United States,
Turkey, and many other nations. Moscow and Damascus typically point to the group’s presence when launching new military offensives.
Tahrir al-Sham has a murky relationship to Turkey. Al-Golani appears
to engage pragmatically with Turkish intelligence but refuses to fully
submit to Ankara’s diktat.
To his dismay, Turkey keeps pushing for control over the entire Idlib
insurgency. Turkish officers tell rebels the only way to appease Russia
and keep al-Assad out of Idlib is for Tahrir al-Sham to dissolve and
let its members join the NLF.
Some Tahrir al-Sham members seem to agree. Syrian analysts, including
Ahmed Aba-Zeid, a well-connected Syrian researcher who supports the
non-jihadist opposition, told IRIN that Turkey now
dominates one wing of the group.
Al-Golani is also under pressure from jihadist hardliners who portray him as a Turkish tool and a sellout.
“Al-Qaeda leaders in Syria tend to see Tahrir al-Sham, and Abu
Mohammed al-Golani in particular, as unprincipled and treacherous,” Cole
Bunzel, a research fellow in Islamic Law and Civilisation at Yale
University, told IRIN. Bunzel said hardliners view Tahrir al-Sham as
“having disobeyed the al-Qaeda emir [leader] in breaking off from the
organisation, and since then persecuting al-Qaeda members in Syria.”
Some of al-Golani’s jihadist critics, many of whom are Jordanians and
Palestinians, have gathered in a pro-al-Qaeda splinter faction known as
Hurras al-Deen. The group is small, but its religious criticism stings
and adds to al-Golani’s challenges. He must now simultaneously fend off
further defections to Hurras al-Deen and prevent his other flank from
being peeled off by Turkey, whose “good cop” attitude is backed up by
the threat of a regime offensive.
A Tahrir al-Sham official again
rejected
calls for the group’s dissolution on 28 August, but added that it seeks
“a salutary solution in the liberated north that spares our people the
expected aggression.” Behind the scenes, the group appears to be
negotiating with Turkey, while Turkey negotiates with Russia.
In Aba-Zeid’s view, how Tahrir al-Sham evolves in the future will depend on Ankara and Moscow.
“If Turkey reaches an understanding with Russia to let Turkey handle
the jihadist file in Idlib, one can expect to see Tahrir al-Sham split”
between members who join the Turkey-backed block and hardliners who draw
closer to Hurras al-Deen, he said.
Minor factions and Chinese jihadists
Complicating the picture in Idlib are several second-tier rebel factions.
On the jihadist side, Hurras al-Deen is accompanied by a number of
small foreign-led factions close to Tahrir al-Sham, including the
Chechens of Junoud al-Sham. The so-called Islamic State also operates
clandestine cells in the area, hunted by both the NLF and Tahrir
al-Sham.
Jaish al-Ezzah, a Free Syrian Army-flagged faction based near Hama,
has not joined the Turkish-backed NLF like many of its former comrades.
Some see the group as a covert Tahrir al-Sham ally, while others say
their base is simply too far from Turkey for joining the alliance to
make sense, so they are surviving by ducking out of intra-rebel
rivalries.
In the western part of the enclave, Jisr al-Shughour has emerged as a stronghold of the
Turkestan Islamic Party,
TIP, a group of Uyghur Chinese jihadists. The TIP’s presence in this
strategic area (it’s near the border with Turkey and
government-controlled Latakia) plus its links with both Tahrir al-Sham
and Turkey could give this group a pivotal role in any upcoming battle.
TIP has worked closely with Syria’s jihadist factions in the past,
but also seems well acquainted with Turkish intelligence. After staying
out of intra-rebel clashes for years, the group shed its neutrality
policy this spring to help Tahrir al-Sham beat back a surprise attack by
Turkey-backed Islamists.
Aba-Zeid, who follows intra-rebel conflicts in Idlib closely, said
TIP helped swing that battle in al-Golani’s favour. But, he still
believes that “Turkey’s influence on TIP remains greater than the
influence of their alliance” with Tahrir al-Sham.
If all of this sounds complicated, it is. But to the Syrian
government, Idlib’s rebels are all terrorists pure and simple – and the
Idlib fighters themselves also see al-Assad as their primary enemy,
transcending factional divides. Aba-Zeid insisted that if Russia
green-lights a Syrian government offensive on Idlib, no matter how the
various groups view Turkey or each other, they would all “prioritise
repelling the attack”.
Mustafa Sejari, a leader in the Ankara-backed Moutassem Brigade,
agreed. “This is the last fortress of the Syrian opposition and
preserving it is everyone’s obligation,” he said.